On May 29, 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported that several large international banks were reporting unjustifiably low LIBOR rates. Since then two large banks, Barclays and UBS, have paid significant fines for manipulating their LIBOR rates, and additional banks are expected to be fined. This paper investigates whether the underreporting of LIBOR rates by some banks significantly affected the reported LIBOR rate by testing whether there was a significant change in the relationship between the LIBOR rate and another rate that reflects the default risk of banks.
(WSJ) reported a marked divergence between the LIBOR rate and the WSJ's calculation of the rate in the default insurance market. Subsequently, two large banks, Barclays and UBS, have paid significant fines for underreporting their LIBOR rates; other banks are expected to be fined. This essay investigates whether the apparent fraud by some banks significantly affected the reported LIBOR rates.
Banks have an incentive to understate their LIBOR rates because LIBOR is thought to reflect the default risk associated with interbank lending.
1 A bank that wants to appear more financially sound than it is has an incentive to underreport its LIBOR rates. Another reason to manipulate the LIBOR is to alter derivative payments (e.g., on Interest Rate Swap contracts). The underreporting by a few banks need not have a significant effect on reported LIBOR rates because each published rate is an average of the submitted rates after the highest and the lowest 25 per cent of the rates have been deleted. This paper investigates whether underreporting of LIBOR rates by some banks significantly reduced the reported LIBOR rate by testing whether there was a statistically significant change in the relationship between the published LIBOR rate and another measure of banks' default risk, the rate of large Certificates of Deposit (CDs). 2 Term CDs and interbank lending are alternative ways for banks to finance lending. Large CDs were not insured, thus both LIBOR and CD rates reflect banks' default risk.
The Methodology
If underreporting of LIBOR rates by some banks affected the published LIBOR rates, there should be a marked reduction in the spread between published LIBOR rates and rates on equivalentterm marketable CDs. If the underreporting of LIBOR rates by some banks affected the published LIBOR rate, there should be a statistically significant reduction in the spread around the time when some banks were underreporting their LIBOR rates. Alternatively, if the underreporting had little or no effect on the published LIBOR rates no statistically significant change in the spreads should be seen. Hence, we examine whether the apparent fraud by some banks had a significant effect on reported LIBOR rates by investigating whether there was a marked change in the spread between equivalent-term LIBOR and CD rates.
We test for significant changes in the LIBOR -CD spread using Bai and Perron's (1998) the underreporting of the LIBOR rates should reduce the average LIBOR -CD spread for a period much longer than a few months. The analysis is done using both the 1-month and 3-month LIBOR and CD rates.
The Findings
The results of the Bai and Perron test for the 1-and 3-month spreads are reported in Table 1 .
There were three statistically significant breaks in the 1-month spread and four in the 3-month spread. 5 The magnitude of the break is expressed in basis points, and the standard errors were obtained using a heteroskedasticity autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix estimator with the Bartlett kernel.
The first two breaks in the rate spreads are similar in magnitude, about -1.5 basis points and event, the estimates suggest that the LIBOR rates declined about 4 basis points relative to the corresponding CD rates. Hence, both rate spreads suggest that the underreporting by some banks affected the published LIBOR rates.
The third break in the 3-month spread, which occurred on December 3, 2008, was very large, more than offsetting the sum of the two previous negative breaks. The third break in the 1-month spread occurred about three months later, on March 11, 2009. The break was positive and essentially offset the two previous negative breaks. Indeed, the hypothesis that the sum of the three breaks is zero cannot be rejected at even the 10 per cent significance level. Both of these breaks occurred as furor over the underreporting by some banks intensified. Indeed, the break in the 3-month spread came on the heels of the release of a draft document by the British Banks' Association on November 17, 2008: The document (i) outlined how bank's LIBOR rates should be set and (ii) required contributing banks to audit their rate submission procedures. Hence, these results suggest that banks stopped underreporting their LIBOR rates as the scandal intensified. In the case of the 3-month spread banks appear to have overreacted; however, the 3-month spread returned to its preunderreporting level until late 2009: The hypothesis that the sum of the four coefficients is zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level.
Discussion and Conclusion
There is growing evidence that some banks intentionally underreported their LIBOR rates to appear more financially sound and to make additional profits. Because the published LIBOR rates are calculated after deleting the highest and lowest 25 per cent of the rates contributed by the panel, it is unclear whether the underreporting materially affected published LIBOR rates. Previous research has produced mixed results. Snider and Youle (2010) funding cost indexes like the eurodollar and the secondary market for credit default swaps. They find some deviations of LIBOR, but they do not conclude that this resulted in a misreporting of LIBOR. We investigate this issue by testing for structural breaks in the spread between termequivalent LIBOR and CD rates using daily data for the period January 2, 2004, through December 31, 2010. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the underreporting of the LIBOR rates by some banks reduced the reported LIBOR rates. Specifically, we find that the average of 1-and 3-month LIBOR -CD spreads declined by nearly 5.5 basis points by mid-2007. We also find that the LIBOR -CD spreads eventually returned to their pre-underreporting levels. 
